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Despite some empirical evidence to the contrary, government subsidy to
higher education is usually presumed to be inequitable because college-educated
workers earn more than less educated workers. Using a simple model of edu-
cational choice with endogenous wages and two worker types, I obtain strong
results concerning this con￿ict between eﬃciency and equity ￿ namely that eq-
uity and eﬃciency do not con￿ict unless there are borrowing constraints. Pre-
existing distorting taxes or real externalities imply that the eﬃcient subsidy
is positive and that the eﬃcient subsidy is also the subsidy which maximizes
the net income of the unskilled. However, when tuition subsidies are used to
overcome borrowing constraints, the eﬃcient subsidy exceeds the subsidy which
maximizes the net income of the unskilled. If borrowing constraints could be
overcome with another policy, like student loans, eﬃciency and equity would
not be in con￿ict. In a more complex model with a range of worker abilities
there is no equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ only when the eﬃcient subsidy is zero ￿
that is, in the absence of real externalities, pre-existing taxes or borrowing
constraints. The presence of any one of these three complications makes the
eﬃcient subsidy positive, while the subsidy that maximizes the net income of
the unskilled is lower. In those cases, eﬃciency con￿icts with equity.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Higher education in most advanced economies is heavily subsidized by government.
Although these subsidies are often justi￿ed on eﬃciency grounds by borrowing con-
straints and externalities, the distributional consequences of higher education subsi-
dies has been of particular concern because the recipients of higher education subsidies
are, on average, wealthier than non-recipients.1 For this reason, it is important to
know what eﬀect a system of higher education subsidies (and the taxes that ￿nance
them) has on the incomes of those who do not take advantage of the subsidies. Is
there a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equity ? Is the eﬃcient subsidy Pareto pre-
ferred ? More generally, is there any non-zero level of subsidy which is a Pareto
improvement over the no-subsidy case ?
Non-recipients might bene￿t from higher education subsidies for three major rea-
sons ￿ ￿scal eﬀects, production eﬀects, and real externalities. Fiscal eﬀects re￿ect
the fact that college-educated workers earn more and hence pay higher taxes and
draw fewer income-tested transfer payments from the government, bene￿tting non-
recipients by either reducing their tax burden or increasing the supply of public goods.
The size of the ￿scal eﬀect will depend on several factors: the extent to which subsi-
dies encourage college enrollment, the eﬀect of college on earnings and the sensitivity
of taxes and transfers to earnings.
Production eﬀects, on the other hand, arise when the number of college educated
workers changes the marginal products of diﬀerent types of labor within a ￿rm, a
result which is implied by any production function with less than perfect substitution
among factors. Since these production eﬀects are internal to the ￿rm, it is well known
that competitive labor markets will lead to eﬃcient resource allocations; hence output
maximization requires no subsidy to college education. However, as George Johnson
(1984) showed, there may be distributional consequences of such subsidies; in fact, he
showed the possibility of the counterintuitive result that non-college educated labor
could gain from a tuition subsidy that increased the amount of college-educated labor
if non-college labor and college labor are suﬃciently complementary in production.
The rise in non-college earnings could outweigh the cost of the subsidy to non-college
workers leading non-college labor to prefer a positive college tuition subsidy. In
Johnson￿s model, the college educated would prefer not to have a subsidy, since the
subsidy increases the number of college-educated workers, reducing their wage.
The third eﬀect, real production externalities, operates across ￿rms and hence
cannot be internalized by the ￿rm. Competitive labor markets lead to less than the
eﬃcient investment in college because social bene￿ts exceed private bene￿ts. For ex-
ample, if the total number of college-educated workers hired by one ￿rm aﬀected the
productivity of labor in other ￿rms, that real externality would imply that decentral-
ized markets would not maximize total output. A tuition subsidy might be needed
1The classic reference is Hansen and Weisbrod (1969) with recent work by Johnson(2002).
2for eﬃciency reasons. And, of course, such a subsidy would have distributional
consequences as well.
The recent general equilibrium microsimulation model of Heckman, Lochner and
Taber (1999) concluded that tuition subsidies could raise the welfare of the least able
workers through general equilibrium eﬀects on the wages of the unskilled. Keane
and Wolpin￿s (1997) microsimulation model concluded quite the opposite ￿ that only
t h em o s ta b l ew o u l db e n e ￿t from a tuition subsidy. Because these models are very
complex and depend on a myriad of assumptions, it is diﬃcult to draw from them ￿rm
conclusions concerning when tuition subsidies might help the unskilled and when they
might not. The models proposed in this paper are simpler ￿ aiding understanding
but, of course, sacri￿cing detail.
The three eﬀects outlined above￿ production eﬀects, real externalities, and ￿scal
eﬀects ￿ are all potential reasons that those who do not directly receive college tuition
subsidies might nevertheless bene￿tf r o mt h e me v e ni ft h e ym u s tp a yf o rp a r to ft h e m .
Part 2 of the paper lays out a simple general model with two types of workers, endoge-
nous wages, and agents making educational choices with no borrowing constraints.
The principal result of Part 2 is that there is no con￿ict between eﬃciency and eq-
uity; that is, subsidy policies which raise national income also raise the net incomes of
those who do not attend college This general proposition is illustrated with speci￿c
examples of production eﬀects, ￿scal externalities and real externalities. Part 3 adds
borrowing constraints to the model and shows that using tuition subsidies to over-
come borrowing constraints can hurt the less skilled. However, if two policy tools are
available ￿ student loans to overcome borrowing constraints and tuition subsidies to
oﬀset ￿scal or real externalities, then the result of Part 2 that equity and eﬃciency
are not in con￿ict ￿ becomes valid again. Part 4 looks at a more complex model
with a range of worker abilities. Although analytic results are not possible with this
model, numerical solutions of equilibria with plausible functional forms show that a
version the basic result of Part 2 continues to hold: when the eﬃcient tuition subsidy
is zero, the subsidy which maximizes the net income of the unskilled is also zero.
However, when the eﬃcient subsidy is not zero ( for example, when distorting taxes
must be levied to ￿nance other government spending), the con￿ict between eﬃciency
and equity reappears.
2 The Simple Model with No Borrowing Constraints
2.1 General results
I ￿rst consider a simple model with only two types of agents, able and less able, and
only two types of labor, skilled and unskilled. Low ability workers cannot invest in
higher education and must be low-skilled workers. High ability workers are capable
of investing in higher education. If they do so, they become high-skilled workers;
3otherwise, they are low-skilled workers. The ability composition of the labor force
is exogenous but the skill composition of the labor force is endogenous because it
depends on the investment decisions of high ability agents. There is no timing or
discounting in the model; all activity, schooling and working, takes place in one
period. Moreover, there is no labor supply decision here only a skill investment
decision.2
Let the size of the labor force equal n,a n dl e ts denote the ratio of skilled to
unskilled workers. The ratio s is endogenous to the model and is a function of
the fraction of high ability individuals in the labor force and the proportion of high
ability workers who get college educations and become skilled workers. The lower
limit of s is, of course 0 and the upper limit is the ratio of high ability to low ability
workers, s. That is, s ∈ [0,s]. For any value of s, the number of unskilled workers in
the economy is n
1+s while the number of skilled workers is ns
1+s. There are no other
factors of production.
Let the resource cost of a worker￿s college education be a constant c. For simplicity
I neglect the time cost in college investment, so c does not depend on the wage of
unskilled workers. For any value of s the total resource cost of investing in skills is just
the product of the number of skilled workers and c,o r nsc
1+s. The policy instrument
available to the government is a tuition subsidy, parameterized by x, the fraction of
the total cost, c, paid by the government. Obviously, x ∈ [0,1]. In equilibrium, the
skill ratio in the economy will depend on the subsidy policy: s(x).
Let yu and ys denote the net income of unskilled and skilled workers. For unskilled
workers, net income will be the unskilled wage less taxes. For skilled workers, net
income will be the skilled wage less taxes and the unsubsidized portion of tuition.
We can write net income for each type of worker as a function of the skill ratio, s,
the tuition subsidy rate, x, and the tax on that type of worker, tu or ts.
yu(s,tu)=wu(s) − tu (1)
ys(s,x,ts)=ws(s) − c(1 − x) − ts (2)
The skill ratio directly aﬀects net income because the marginal product, and hence
the wage, wu or ws, of each type of labor depends on the relative amounts of the two
types of labor in the economy. The subsidy rate, x,d i r e c t l ya ﬀects only the net
income of the skilled who must pay tuition. The tax burdens on each type of labor
must satisfy the government budget constraint:
2In George Johnson￿s(1984) model, there are two types of agents but three types of labor. Some
agents are incapable of bene￿tting from higher education, while the others can bene￿t. If an agent of
the latter type invests in higher education, he becomes the highest skilled type of labor. Otherwise













cxs = tu + sts (3)
The government budget constraint, (3) and the structure of the tax system implic-
itly establish the tax burden on a worker as a function of s and x: ts(s,x)a n dtu(s,x).
For example, if the tax structure were a head tax, then tu(s,x)=ts(s,x)= cxs
1+s.
Substituting these tax functions back into (1) and (2), we can write the net
income of a worker as a function only of s and x:
yu(s,x)=wu(s) − tu(s,x)( 4 )
ys(s,x)=ws(s) − c(1 − x) − ts(s,x)( 5 )
The fundamental equilibrium condition which determines s for any value of the
policy variable, x, is the following. High ability workers will ￿nd it advantageous to
invest in college as long as the net income of a skilled worker exceeds the net income
of an unskilled worker. Hence, the equilibrium amount of human capital investment
activity, which determines s , is the solution to
yu(s,x)=ys(s,x)( 6 )
Equilibrium condition (6) , which holds for all values of x,i m p l i c i t l yd e ￿nes the
economy-wide skill ratio, s, as a function of the tuition subsidy, x.
We can now write total national income, Y , as the weighted sum of net income







• yu(s,x)( 7 )
To ￿nd the eﬃcient level of the tuition subsidy (the level that maximizes total










(1 + s)2 (8)














Equation (9) implies that the eﬀect of x on national income is in the same direction
as the eﬀect of x on the net income of an unskilled worker and the net income of a
skilled worker. Most important, there is no con￿ict between equity and eﬃciency
here; whatever tuition policy maximizes national income maximizes the net income
of the unskilled. Note that this result holds regardless of the form of the two-factor
production function and of the nature of the tax system.
Proposition 1 If there are no borrowing constraints, so that all able agents can
invest in education whenever it is ￿nancially advantageous to do so, then the tuition
subsidy which maximizes national income also maximizes the income of the unskilled.
There is no con￿ict between equity and eﬃciency.
This discussion has assumed that the economy is at an interior solution, in which
some but not all of the able agents acquire skills ( s<s ). What if we are instead
at a corner solution ? Suppose all able agents invest in college even with no subsidy
? Then, of course, tuition subsidies won￿t change any behavior ( ds
dx =0)s ot h e
eﬃcient subsidy must be zero. Any positive subsidy merely redistributes from the
unskilled to the skilled. Again, the eﬃcient subsidy (no subsidy at all) is also the
subsidy which maximizes the income of the unskilled.
2.2 Three examples
I now illustrate the implications of this proposition with three examples: production
eﬀects, ￿scal externalities and real externalities.
2.2.1 Production Eﬀects
Is there a plausible case for subsidizing college on the basis that unskilled workers￿
wages are an increasing function of the ratio of skilled workers to unskilled workers,
as in neoclassical, two-factor production functions? Suppose output is produced by a
linearly homogenous (constant returns to scale) production function with skilled and
unskilled labor as inputs. The assumption of homogeneity of degree one allows writing
total output divided by the number of unskilled workers as f(s),where f0(s) > 0
and f00 < 0. The marginal product of skilled labor, ws,i sf0(s) , while the wage
of unskilled labor, wu, is f(s) − sf
0(s). As expected, the wage of skilled workers
decreases in s while the wage of unskilled workers rises with s . Hence, unskilled
workers would seem to have an interest in increasing the number of skilled workers
through tuition subsidies.






(s) − c (10)
6It is easy to verify that the value of s which satis￿es (10), which re￿ects privately
optimal schooling behavior when individuals pay the full cost of college, is also the
value of s which maximizes the total output of the economy net of schooling costs.
As expected, no government subsidy is necessary to achieve eﬃciency since there are
no externalities or other market imperfections.
Although the tuition subsidy rate which maximizes total income is 0, is it possible
that a positive tuition subsidy could increase the income of low ability workers (and
necessarily hurt high ability workers since total national income net of college costs
must fall) ? After all, the greater the number of skilled workers, the higher the
marginal products of unskilled workers in this two-factor production function. If
this positive wage eﬀect outweighed the tax cost to unskilled workers of ￿nancing the
tuition subsidy, it would seem that subsidizing tuition might improve the net incomes
of less skilled workers. However, as plausible as this intuition might be, it turns out
to be false.
National income less college costs can be written as output per unskilled
worker times the number of unskilled workers, less college costs times the number of
skilled workers. This is f(s) • ( n
1+s) − c • ( ns
1+s), since f(s) is output per unskilled
worker. Now consider the behavior of able agents. Future skilled workers pay net
tuition of (1 − x)c. If the subsidy is ￿nanced by a head tax on everyone, that head






The left hand side of (11) are tax revenues from the head tax, t, while the right
hand side are expenditures on the college tuition subsidies of cx for the ns
1+s skilled





Now consider the net income of unskilled workers, which is the unskilled wage less
an unskilled worker￿s share of college subsidies. With the budget balancing head tax
given by (12), the net income of an unskilled worker is
f(s) − sf
0
(s) − xc • (
s
1+s
)( 1 3 )
Since the net income of a skilled worker is the skilled wage less the unsubsidized
portion of college tuition and the head tax, the equilibrium condition parallel to (10)





(s) − (1 − x)c (14)
7Starting with the equilibrium condition (14), some algebra reveals that the net
income of an unskilled worker (expression (13)) is equal to per capita national income
less college cost, or f(s)/(1 + s) − cs/(1 + s), or
f(s) − sf
0










Equation (15) implies that when college subsidies are ￿nanced by a head tax, the
subsidy rate which maximizes national income net of college cost is the subsidy rate
which maximizes the net income of unskilled workers. With no externalities or other
complications, the subsidy which maximizes national income less college cost is zero,
as is the optimal subsidy rate from the point of view of the unskilled (and the skilled,
for that matter).
What about a more realistic tax alternative to a head tax ? In this model workers
diﬀer on two dimensions, ability and skill. Only skill is observable (and therefore
taxable) because high skill workers (who have been to college) earn more. Hence,
the only way a tax system could deviate from a head tax is by distinguishing between
high and low skill workers. Suppose that skilled and unskilled workers pay possibly
diﬀerent amounts toward the college subsidy. It is convenient to parameterize this
more complex tax system in the following way. Let α denote the ratio of a skilled
worker￿s tax bill relative to a head tax. Thus, a value of α = 1 corresponds to a head
tax, while α > 1 indicates that skilled workers pay more tax than a head tax and
therefore more than unskilled workers. Since the head tax that balances the govern-
ment￿s budget is given by (12), the skilled worker￿s tax bill will be αxc( s
1+s),which
implies that the net income of a skilled worker, his wage less the unsubsidized part of
college tuition less his tax bill, is f
0(s) − (1 − x)c − αxc( s
1+s). The tax burden of an






Therefore, the net income of an unskilled worker can be written as
f(s) − sf
0
(s) − xc • (
s
1+s
)[1− (α − 1)s)] (16)
As above, wages adjust until the net income of skilled workers equals the net income
of unskilled workers, implying:
f
0





(s) − xc • (
s
1+s
)[1− (α − 1)s]( 1 7 )
Equation (17) implicitly de￿nes equilibrium s given a subsidy rate, x, and a tax
progressivity parameter, α. The equilibrium condition says that as the subsidy rate is
changed, the net incomes of skilled and unskilled workers move in tandem. Moreover,
as (9) shows, the eﬀect of x on national income is in the same direction as the eﬀect
8on the net incomes of a skilled or an unskilled worker.3 Therefore, whatever raises
national income net of college costs will raise the net income of an unskilled worker,
and vice versa, regardless of the value of α,the relative tax burden on the skilled.
Since we have already established that the optimal subsidy from the point of view of
national income is zero, it follows that the subsidy which maximizes the net income
of the unskilled is also zero, as is the optimal subsidy for the skilled.
Therefore, in a two factor model with no externalities, preexisting taxes or borrow-
ing constraints, the optimal tuition subsidy from the point of view of both skilled and
unskilled workers is zero, even though more skilled labor raises the wage of unskilled
labor and the tax burden can be higher on the skilled than on the unskilled.
2.2.2 Fiscal Externalities
This section examines the possibility that a ￿scal externality might generate the
outcome that tuition subsidies make the unskilled better oﬀ. How does the situation
change when there are non-lump sum taxes levied to ￿nance other public goods ?
Now taxes distort the schooling decision (because a worker￿s tax depends on his skill)
and a subsidy may be needed to achieve eﬃciency. Will low ability workers prefer a
higher subsidy than high ability workers ?
Suppose nG is the exogenous amount of public goods to be ￿nanced by taxes
while xcns/(1 + s) is again the total cost of the tuition subsidy. Since per capita
government spending is G + xcs/(1 + s), the tax on a skilled worker will be α times
that amount or α(G + xcs/(1 + s)) while the tax on each unskilled worker is, from
the government budget constraint, [G + xcs
1+s](1 + s − αs). The net wage of a skilled
worker is f
0(s) − (1 − x)c− α(G + xcs/(1 + s)), while the net wage of an unskilled
worker is f(s)−sf
0(s)−[G+ xcs
1+s](1+s−αs). Again, assuming an interior solution in
which neither all nor none of the able agents get college educations, the equilibrium








](1+s−αs)( 1 8 )
So, as before, the fortunes of skilled and unskilled workers ride together. Whatever
subsidy maximizes national income less public good and college costs will again max-
imize the net income of each type of worker. Does the preexisting distortion ￿ the
fact that the tax which ￿nances the public good discourages investment in education￿
imply that to maximize net national income the subsidy should not be zero ?
3This is not as trivial a proposition as it might seem. National income is the weighted average of
the net income of a skilled worker and the net income of an unskilled where the weights correspond
to the number of skilled and unskilled workers. It is conceivable that a tuition subsidy policy might
reduce the net income of both types of workers but raise national income by increasing the relative
number of the higher paid workers. That weighting possibility cannot happen here, but as will be
seen, can happen when there are borrowing constraints.
9The answer, not surprisingly, is yes. In fact, the optimal tuition subsidy exactly
counteracts the distorting eﬀect of the tax, yielding exactly the same equilibrium as
a head tax with no tuition subsidy. This implies that the optimal tuition subsidy is
an increasing function of G and of α. The greater the preexisting tax burden (G)
and the more progressive the tax system (α), the greater the optimal tuition subsidy
rate.4
2.2.3 True Externalities
Finally, consider the case of real externalities from schooling. One kind of
real externality is evidenced in production ￿ a worker￿s marginal product rises as the
number of skilled workers in the economy rises, holding constant the number of skilled
workers at the worker￿s ￿rm.5 This externality cannot be internalized ￿ a ￿rm does
not hire enough skilled workers because the ￿rm does not realize the bene￿t of skilled
workers to production in other ￿rms.
A simple model which illustrates this real externality adds an externality term,
θ(s) to the production function. Now let output per unskilled worker in a ￿rm be
given by f(sf)•θ(se), where sf represents the skill ratio at the ￿rm and se is the skill
ratio in the economy. The marginal product of a skilled worker at a ￿rm is θ(se)•f·( sf)
while the marginal product of an unskilled worker is θ(se)[f(sf)−sf •f0(sf)] . In a
competitive economy with many identical ￿rms, the skill ratio at each ￿rm will equal
the skill ratio in the economy. At a subsidy rate of zero, when each skilled worker
must pay full tuition, the equilibrium condition, which equates the net income of
skilled and unskilled workers, becomes
θ(s) • f
0
(s) − c = θ(s)[f(s) − s • f
0
(s)] (19)
The eﬃcient level of skill in the economy is the value of s which maximizes national
income. By an argument parallel to that used to derive equation (8) above, the
optimal value of s is the solution to
θ(s) • f
0
(s) − c = θ(s)[f(s) − s • f
0
(s)] − (1 + s) • θ
0(s) • f(s) < θ(s)( 2 0 )
Since a real externality implies that θ
0(s) > 0 , the last term on the right hand
side of (20) is negative so eﬃciency requires a value of s high enough that the net
income of skilled workers is less than the net income of unskilled workers. Private
decision making will obviously not accomplish this, as the equilibrium condition (19)
shows.
4Trostel(1996) also makes an eﬃciency argument for tuition subsidies based on distorting taxa-
tion.
5Acemoglu and Angrist(2000) and Morretti(2002) both estimate models of this type of production
externality, but arrive at contrasting es t i m a t e so ft h es i z eo ft h ee x t e r n a l i t y .
10Comparing (19) and (20), it is easy to derive the optimal subsidy rate, x ,a sa
function of the optimal skill ratio s∗,t h ev a l u eo fs which solves (20). The optimal




∗) • (1 + s
∗)( 2 1 )
The intuition behind condition (21) is straightforward. At the optimal subsidy
rate, the total dollar subsidy received by a skilled worker is cx. The right side of
(21) is proportional to the external eﬀect of one more skilled worker on output per
unskilled worker.
In the presence of real externalities, therefore, too little schooling is chosen to
maximize national income; hence, the optimal tuition subsidy is positive. Since the
goal of maximizing the net wage of the unskilled is identical to the goal of maximizing
national income net of schooling costs, the eﬃcient subsidy is also the subsidy which
maximizes the income of the unskilled.
2.3 No distributional eﬀects without borrowing constraints
The principal implication of this section is that distributional issues are not
important if every able person gets higher education whenever it raises his net income.
That result follows from the equilibrium condition which equates the net income of
skilled and less skilled workers when able individuals are able to pursue privately
optimal schooling investments. Hence, any policy which raises total income net
of schooling costs raises the net income of an unskilled worker. Production eﬀects
alone do not justify tuition subsidies to achieve eﬃciency and therefore cannot justify
subsidies to increase the income of the less skilled. When distorting taxes are used
to ￿nance public goods, discouraging investment in schooling below its optimal level,
a tuition subsidy oﬀsets the tax distortion and can raise total net income. In that
case, the optimal subsidy exactly oﬀsets the deviation of the tax system from a head
tax. Optimal tuition subsidies are also positive if there are real externalities of
education, since national income, and hence the wages of the unskilled, are increased
with subsidies to education.
3 The Simple Model with Borrowing Constraints
The previous section argued that equity and eﬃciency are not in con￿ict when stu-
dents can ￿nance the investment in their own educations. Both ￿scal externalities
and real externalities would justify tuition subsidies from an eﬃciency standpoint and
such subsidies would also enhance the net income of the unskilled. Production eﬀects
alone do not make a case for subsidy even though unskilled wages are an increasing
11function of the level of skill.6 This section examines how these conclusions are
altered if borrowing constraints prevent students from making pro￿table investments
in college educations.
The eﬀect of borrowing constraints is to invalidate equilibrium condition (6).
Since all pro￿table investment in skill cannot be made, the net income of an unskilled
worker will not be less than the net income of a skilled worker, even if s<s .O n e
way to parameterize borrowing constraints is to rewrite (6) as:
yu(s,x)+k = ys(s,x)( 2 2 )
where k parameterizes the degree of borrowing constraint. If k =0, t h e nt h e r e
is no borrowing constraint. Larger positive values of k denote increasingly eﬀective
constraints on borrowing, driving a bigger wedge between the net incomes of the less
skilled and the skilled.
To see what a borrowing constraint does to the results in the previous section,











(1 + s)2 (23)
The new equilibrium condition with borrowing constraints (equation (22)) implies




dx . As a result, the equation above











The ￿rst term in (24) will be positive if borrowing constraints are eﬀective and
subsidies induce more skill investment. Therefore at the level of x which maximizes
national income (Y ), where dY
dx =0,
dyu
dx < 0. This last inequality says that at the
eﬃcient subsidy level, subsidies reduce the net income of unskilled workers. Hence
reducing the subsidy from this level would reduce national income but help unskilled
workers. There is now a trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency. Note that nothing
in equation (24) precludes the existence of ￿scal or real externalities. In that case,
(24) does not, of course, imply that the optimal subsidy from the point of view of
the unskilled is zero; starting from x = 0 , if an increase in x raises Y ,
dyu
dx could be
positive. The implication is rather that the optimal subsidy from the point of view






dx , we have the seemingly paradoxical outcome that the subsidy has
the same eﬀect on the net income of the skilled as on the net income of the unskilled.
6This result contrasts with that of G. Johnson￿s(1984) paper because, as mentioned above, G.
Johnson￿s model has three types of labor.
12How is it possible, then, for national income to be maximized at a subsidy rate which
(locally) reduces the net incomes of both skilled and unskilled workers (an outcome
that is possible if in (24) dY
dx > 0 while
dyu
dx < 0 ). The answer to the paradox is
that the subsidy is inducing individuals to invest in schooling which raises their net
income (since ys >y u ) even though the subsidy may be reducing both ys and yu .















The ￿rst term on the right hand side of (25) is the production eﬀect ￿ the increase
in unskilled net income that arises because subsidies raise the ratio of skilled to
unskilled labor and thereby raise the unskilled wage. The second term is the negative
direct eﬀect of x ￿ higher subsidies and more skilled workers means higher taxes for
the unskilled. In the parallel expression for skilled workers, the signs are reversed ￿
subsidies reduce the skilled wage but increase net income holding the wage constant.
Proposition 2 When borrowing constraints prevent some who would pro￿tf r o me d -
ucation from acquiring it, a tuition subsidy can increase national income even in
the absence of true externalities or ￿scal eﬀects. The eﬃcient subsidy is higher than
the subsidy which would maximize the net income of an unskilled worker, though the
subsidy which maximizes the income of the unskilled is not necessarily zero.
Proposition 2 suggests that the equity eﬃciency trade-oﬀ arises because tuition
subsidies are used to oﬀset the eﬀects of borrowing constraints without treating the
root cause. A government with two policy instruments available to it ￿ student
loan policies and tuition subsidies ￿ could use student loans to oﬀset the borrowing
constraints and tuition subsidies to overcome externalities. Though this is certainly
not a novel suggestion, what this analysis suggests is that it would have the addi-
tional advantage of eliminating the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equity. Eﬃcient
educational policies would also maximize the income of unskilled workers.
4A M o r e C o m p l e x M o d e l
The results presented so far have used a particularly simple model of the workforce
in which agents possess only two levels of ability and untrained able agents are equiv-
alent in production to the less able, who by assumption, are unable to pro￿tf r o m
schooling. In this section, we examine whether the conclusions of the previous sec-
tions of the paper continue to hold when the model is made somewhat more complex.
In particular, we consider a model in which worker ability is distributed over an in-
terval of values and workers of any ability can attend school (though some will ￿nd
it not pro￿t a b l et od os o ) .
13L e tw o r k e ra b i l i t y ,a, be distributed on the closed interval [0,b]a c c o r d i n gt ot h e
distribution function G(a). A worker with ability a earns a•ws if he acquires a college
education and earns a•wu if he doesn￿t. Hence ability and schooling are complements
in the earnings function. Each individual chooses whether to go to college based on
whether earnings net of college costs are increased by college. For a given ws and
wu, and cost of college, c, an individual chooses to go to college if a • (ws − wu) >c .
In equilibrium, ws will be no less than wu since no-one would pay for the privilege of
reducing their wage. Individual choice of optimal schooling implies that all workers
with a>b a go to college and all workers with ability less than b a do not go. The
critical level of ability, b a ,i sd e ￿ned by
b a =m i n [ b,c/(ws − wu)] (26)
At an individual level, college costs and the diﬀerence between the skilled and
unskilled wage determine who chooses to go to college. At an economy wide level,
however, those choices determine the skill level in the economy and hence the level
of wages of both types of workers. Letting s again denote the ratio of skilled labor to
unskilled labor in the workforce, a neoclassical production function with two factors
of production makes ws a decreasing function of s while the unskilled wage, wu ,i s
an increasing function of s . Since the total amount of skill in the economy is just
the sum of the eﬃciency units of labor (i.e., the ability) of the workers who choose







Clearly, the lower is b a , the larger will be the fraction of the population going
to college, 1 − G(b a) , the higher will be the skill ratio s ,t h el o w e rw i l lb et h e
skilled wage ws and the higher will be the unskilled wage wu . The equilibrium for
the economy is de￿ned by the conditions (26) and (27) along with the production
function relations that determine the skilled and unskilled wage rates :ws = f
0(s)
and wu = f(s) − sf
0(s).
Our new model economy can be used to examine how tuition subsidy policies may
aﬀect total national income (eﬃciency) or the distribution of income (equity). In this
model, total income is just the sum of the wage income of all the workers less the




a • wu(s)dG +
Z b
b a
a • ws(s)dG − c • (1 − G(b a)) (28)
In (28) the ￿rst term on the right is the wage income of the unskilled, the second
is the wage income of the skilled and the last term is the cost of college multiplied
7To simplify these expressions, the model assumes that the size of the population is 1 rather than
n as in the simple model above.
14by the fraction of the population choosing college. In measuring equity eﬀects of a
policy it is important to realize that policies will typically not only aﬀect the relative
wages of sklled and unskilled owrkers but will also change the size of the population
that remains unskilled, by aﬀecting the critical value, b a .
4.1 Tuition Subsidy Financed by Proportional Taxation
One particularly important, and relatively simple, policy is a tuition subsidy ￿nanced
by a proportional tax on all earnings. The tuition subsidy, x, reduces the private
cost of attending college to (1−x)•c. The government taxes all earnings at the rate,
t ,t o￿nance the subsidy implying a government budget constraint:
x • c • [1 − G(b a)] = t • [
Z b a
0
a • wu(s)dG +
Z b
b a
a • ws(s)dG]( 2 9 )
We now have a ￿ve equation model, equations(26), (27) and (29) along with
ws = f
0(s)a n dwu = f(s) − sf
0(s). Given a subsidy rate, x,w ec a ns o l v ef o r
equilibrium values of ws,w u, b a,s and t. Analytic solutions are intractable with general
production functions and distributions of a ,s ow et u r nt os p e c i ￿cf u n c t i o n a lf o r m s
for those two functions and calculate equilibria numerically. The speci￿c functions
chosen are a uniform density for a and a Cobb-Douglas production function. That
is,
g(a)=1 /b for a ∈ [0,b]( 3 0 )
f(s)=s
β where 0 < β < 1( 3 1 )
The two crucial values are the b relative to college cost, c , and the value of β.T o
illustrate a particular equilibrium, suppose c =1 ,b =2 ,a n dβ =0 .5. In the absence
of a tuition subsidy, b a =1 .61 implying that about 19.5% of the population goes to
college. s is about 0.54, wu = .37 and ws = .68 . National income net of college
costs is .38.
Letting β vary from 0 to 1, and letting c vary from .25 to 2.0, the policy which
maximizes eﬃciency in every case is a tuition subsidy of zero. This is to be expected
since there are no externalities or preexisting taxes.
Is it possible that tuition subsidies raise the net income of the unskilled ? With
proportional taxation, the hypothetical policies change each unskilled worker￿s net
income by the same proportion since net income is a • (1 − t) • wu and t and wu are
the same for everyone. Hence an obvious measure of the equity eﬀects of a policy
is whether the net (after-tax) unskilled wage rate rises or falls. If it rises, then all
15unskilled workers are better oﬀ.8 Computing the equilibria for the full range of pa-
rameter values, the results of Proposition 1 continue to hold for this more complicated
speci￿cation of the model, and these functional forms.
Proposition 3 For the more general model described by equations (26) though (29),
the eﬃcient tuition subsidy is zero. The tuition subsidy which maximizes the net
income of the unskilled is also zero. There is no con￿ict between eﬃciency and
equity.
4.2 When the Eﬃcient Subsidy is not Zero
The argument above showed that part of the result derived for the simple model in
Section 2 holds for the more complex, multi-ability model at least for certain speci￿c
functional forms. That is, there is no equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ when the eﬃcient
subsidy is zero. In this section, I examine the case when the eﬃcient subsidy is
not zero. One reason the eﬃcient subsidy may not be zero is preexisting distorting
taxation needed to ￿nance other government spending. The distortion is this model
arises because the after-tax gap between the skilled and unskilled wage will be lower
than the pre-tax gap for most reasonable tax systems. This discourages investment in
schooling below the eﬃcient level. Tuition subsidies can oﬀset the eﬀects of distorting
taxes and raise national income.
Again, I use the model parameterized by equations (30) to (31) except now the
proportional taxation must pay for both tuition subsidies and the exogenous level of
other government spending. Numerical computation of equilibria reveal that, as in
the case of the simpler model studied in sections 2 and 3, the eﬃcient subsidy is now
positive because taxation discourages investment in schooling. However, the eﬃcient
subsidy level is no longer the subsidy which maximizes the income of the unskilled.
The optimal subsidy from the point of view of the unskilled is still zero. Equity and
eﬃciency are now in con￿ict.
The same result obtains when real externalities exist. I augment the model
of equations (26) to (31) to include a real externality eﬀect by making output per
unskilled worker a Cobb-Douglas function of the skill ratio in the worker￿s ￿rm, sf
, and the skill ratio in the entire economy, se : f(sf,s e)=s
β
f • sγ
e . When, for
example, c = .5,β = .5,a n dγ = .05, the eﬃcient subsidy is no longer zero but
rather .66 requiring a proportional tax rate of .22. However, the tuition subsidy which
maximizes the net income of the unskilled is zero; the eﬃcient subsidy reduces the
net income of the unskilled by 6.5% .Other parameter values reveal similar ￿ndings;
the eﬃcient subsidy is now larger than the equitable subsidy.
8As mentioned above, policy changes the population of unskilled workers by changing b a.I nt h i s
case, the tuition subsidy induces some workers to get a college education; they are obviously better
oﬀ than they would have been had they not decided to become skilled. If the policy raises the net
wage rate of the unskilled, therefore, it must raise the net incomes of every person who would have
been unskilled in the absence of a tuition subsidy
16Finally, as was shown with the simple model, borrowing constraints imply that it
is eﬃcient to subsidize tuition. In the context of the model described by equations
(26) to (31) , the eﬃcient subsidy is again greater than the equitable subsidy for the
full range of parameter values.
Proposition 4 In the more general model described by equations (26) to (31 ), pre-
existing distorting taxes, real externalities and borrowing constraints all imply that it
is eﬃcient to subsidize tuition. However, in each of these cases, the optimal tuition
subsidy from the point of view of unskilled workers is less than the eﬃcient subsidy
and may, in fact, be zero. Hence, there is a con￿ict between equity and eﬃciency.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Despite some empirical evidence to the contrary, there is a strong presumption
that government subsidy to higher education is inequitable because college educated
workers earn more than less educated workers. A simple model of educational choice
and wage determination yields strong results concerning this con￿ict between eﬃ-
ciency and equity ￿ namely that there is no con￿ict between equity and eﬃciency
unless there are borrowing constraints. This result is driven by the fact that in equi-
lbrium the marginal unskilled worker is indiﬀerent about getting education￿ the net
incomes of the educated and less eduated are the same. Pre-existing distorting taxes
or real externalities imply that the eﬃcient subsidy is positive and that the eﬃcient
subsidy is also the subsidy which maximizes the net income of the unskilled. How-
ever, when tuition subsidies are used to overcome borrowing constraints, the eﬃcient
subsidy exceeds the subsidy which maximizes the net income of the unskilled. If
borrowing constraints could be overcome with another policy, like student loans, ef-
￿ciency and equity would not be in con￿ict. In a more complex model with a range
of worker abilities, the equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ disappears only when the eﬃcient
subsidy is zero ￿ that is, in the absence of real externalities, pre-existing taxes or
borrowing constraints. The presence of any one of these three complications makes
the eﬃcient subsidy positive, while the subsidy that maximizes the net income of the
unskilled is lower. Eﬃciency then con￿icts with equity.
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